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1. Introduction
This paper studies the tension between two rst-order problems faced by the modern rm.
The rst is how to terminate unskilled managers early. The nancial crisis demonstrates the
substantial losses that can occur if misguided decisions are left unchecked. A quite separate
challenge is how to incentivize skilled managers to invest for the long-term. Nowadays, compet-
itive success increasingly hinges upon intangible assets such as human capital (Zingales, 2000).
Since intangibles only pay o¤ in the long-run, managers may underinvest in them (Stein, 1988.)
These two challenges fundamentally conict. Investors can mitigate the value destroyed by
an unskilled manager by forcing him to reveal short-term earnings, thus giving themselves the
option to terminate him if prots are low. However, the same termination threat may deter a
skilled manager from undertaking e¢ cient long-term projects that risk low short-term earnings.
This paper demonstrates how risky debt can alleviate this tension, by playing two distinct
roles which address the two separate challenges. The disciplinary e¤ect of debt addresses
termination by forcing the manager to make an interim payment. The failure to do so reveals
that earnings are weak, the manager is likely unskilled, and thus termination is desirable.
Indeed, Jensen (1989) argues that this disciplinary e¤ect explains why buyouts are levered: debt
is a mechanism to force managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on empire-building
projects.However, such a justication leaves many questions unanswered. First, dividends
can also impose discipline: as Jensen also notes, debt is a substitute for dividends.Second,
buyouts typically feature a concentrated shareholder but, if the only e¤ect of debt is discipline,
equityholders are irrelevant and dispersed ownership would be equally e¤ective. Third, it is the
manager who controls leverage going forward, and he can raise equity to repay the debt and
free himself from its discipline. Fourth, the disciplinary e¤ect may deter investment.
This is where the second e¤ect of debt comes in: the concentration e¤ect, which addresses
investment. The core model contains a single rm, single large investor and a continuum of
atomistic investors. If atomistic investors provide debt, the large investors limited funds com-
prise a greater proportion of the total equity. Thus, a non-paying manager is not automatically
red; instead, the large investors concentrated stake gives her an incentive to gather costly in-
formation on the underlying cause of weak earnings. If the cause is low managerial skill, the rm
is liquidated; if the cause is investment, it is continued. Knowing that investors will make an
informed liquidation decision ex post, the manager pursues long-run growth ex ante. A skilled
manager invests without fear of termination; an unskilled manager is e¢ ciently terminated.
The concentration e¤ect distinguishes this paper from theories of the disciplinary role of
debt: it has di¤erent implications for the substitutability of dividends for debt, the e¤ect of debt
on investment, the optimal level of debt, and the concurrence of risky debt with concentrated
equity. In Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996), debt also forces the manager to
pay out cash. Dividends would have the same disciplinary e¤ect, since missing a dividend also
reveals low earnings, and are thus a perfect substitute  these models are theories of total
payout (debt plus dividends) rather than debt in particular. Here, the nancing structure must
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not only allow termination, but also induce investment. The latter requires the concentration
e¤ect, which only debt has. Turning to the e¤ect of debt, in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990),
debt reduces investment by lowering free cash; here, it can have the opposite e¤ect by inducing
monitoring. Moving to the optimal level of debt, it is borderline nonrepayable in disciplinary
models. Since the only role of debt is to impose discipline, it should be just high enough
that a bad type cannot pay it. In Lambrecht and Myers (2008), strictly nonrepayable debt
induces excessive divestment; here, it is e¢ cient as it increases concentration. Finally, the
model predicts that leverage should coincide with concentrated equity investors who actively
monitor, as documented empirically by Cotter and Peck (2001).
The above predictions are primarily generated by the concentration e¤ect. Moreover, by
analyzing two distinct and conicting agency problems (liquidation and investment), the model
studies the interaction between the concentration and disciplinary e¤ects together, which gen-
erates additional implications. These relate to the joint determinants of capital structure and
dividend policy as a function of the relative severity of a rms agency issues. While standard
empirical studies analyze the determinants of leverage (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995), this
paper emphasizes that leverage is the product of two factors: the level of total payout and its
division between debt and dividends. The importance of short-term termination determines the
need for the disciplinary e¤ect and thus the level of total payout. If termination is unlikely to
be optimal (e.g. the rm is a start-up with low liquidation value), total payout should be low;
indeed, such rms are typically unlevered and pay no dividends. The importance of long-term
investment determines the need for the concentration e¤ect and thus the composition of total
payout. If growth opportunities are attractive, any payout should be in the form of debt. While
Rajan and Zingales nd that leverage is negatively correlated with growth opportunities, the
model predicts a positive correlation once total payout is controlled for. Their negative corre-
lation suggests that a growing rm prefers to be unlevered but if termination is important,
being unlevered is not an option. The appropriate comparison is debt versus other forms of
payout that would achieve termination; debt is less detrimental to growth than dividends.
One application of the model is to LBOs, which are often undertaken to discipline managers
to scrap ine¢ cient projects, but monitoring helps ensure that e¢ cient investment is not also cut.
Indeed, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that, from the 1990s, buyouts have predominantly
been in middle-aged rms in growing industries such as IT/media/telecoms, nancial services
and healthcare. Lerner, Sorensen, and Strömberg (2010) nd that LBOs lead to no decrease in
innovation activity and an increase in the quality of innovation.
The above single-rmmodel is analyzed in Section 2. Section 3 extends the model to multiple
large investors and heterogeneous managers, where good managers have a higher probability of
having growth opportunities than bad types. A separating equilibrium is sustainable where bad
managers run unlevered rms nanced exclusively by small shareholders, and good managers
run levered rms and are nanced by both large and atomistic investors.
The two roles of debt, which lead to rm viability in a single-manager setting, also achieve
separation in a multi-manager setting. The disciplinary e¤ect of debt renders it a credible signal
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of managerial quality: bad managers avoid leverage as they are likely to default. However, in
models where only credibility of the signal matters, borderline nonrepayable debt is optimal 
debt is just high enough that a bad type defaults; additional debt would augment signaling costs.
In addition, dividends are equally credible as they also have a disciplinary e¤ect: Bhattacharya
(1979) shows that Rosss (1977) idea of signaling with debt can also be achieved with dividends.
However, credibility is not the only issue. The signal must be a desirable one that good
managers wish to emit. In standard models, a good manager automatically wishes to reveal
his quality, as his pay is exogenously assumed to depend on short-run value (Ross, 1977; Bhat-
tacharya, 1979) or signaling quality is necessary to raise nancing (Myers and Majluf, 1984;
Fulghieri and Lukin, 2001.) Here, pay is not tied to short-run value and even bad managers can
raise nancing, so the traditional motives to signal do not exist. This is where the concentration
e¤ect comes in: it provides a motive to signal. This motive is not to obtain a greater level of
funds, but to attract a di¤erent type of funds. Signaling quality attracts large investors. A
large investor provides no more funds than several small investors, but is critically di¤erent as
she has the incentive to monitor, thus allowing the long-term project to be taken. Since good
managers have a greater probability of having growth opportunities, this advantage is more
important to them and separation is achieved.
The di¤erent motives for signaling lead to di¤erent results on the dynamic consistency of
debt and the e¤ect of signaling on total surplus. In this and other models, debt hurts the
manager owing to the disciplinary e¤ect, but he willingly bears these costs to signal quality. If
the goal of signaling is to raise funds, it is already achieved in the rst period. Hence, once funds
have been raised, the manager has incentives to delever and free himself from discipline. This
concern applies not only to signaling theories, but also single-rm models in which investors
initially impose debt on the manager to solve free cash ow problems (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Stulz,
1990.) As noted by Zwiebel (1996), it is the manager who controls leverage going forward, and
he may subsequently reduce it to increase free cash.
Here, debt is dynamically consistent since its advantages are not conned to the rst period,
and so the manager has an incentive to retain it. Debt benets the manager by inducing moni-
toring: this requires not only attracting a large investor through initially signaling quality, but
also persuading her to monitor in the future by maintaining leverage. In short, the disciplinary
e¤ect renders debt a credible signal in the rst period. The concentration e¤ect renders it a
desirable signal that the rm wishes to maintain in future periods. This persistence of leverage
is consistent with the ndings of Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).
The managers desire for monitoring in turn results from the analysis of a di¤erent agency
problem to prior debt theories. In Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996), there is a
fundamental e¤ort conict where rm value maximization requires the manager to exert e¤ort
or forgo private benets. Investorsrole is to be an adversary of the manager, preventing
shirking or private benets. Monitoring hurts the manager, and so he wishes to delever to reduce
investorsincentives to do so. Here, there is no e¤ort conict with respect to project selection:
the long-term project maximizes both rm value and private benets. A monitors role is to
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be an allyof the manager, allowing him to choose the project that he wishes to anyway in
the absence of termination concerns. Since the monitor helps the manager, the latter has an
incentive to retain the former through maintaining leverage.1 Indeed, Cornelli and Karakas
(2010) nd that LBOs lead to increases in operating performance, but also a reduction in CEO
turnover, suggesting that buyouts allow the manager to have a longer-term horizon.
Turning to welfare e¤ects, signaling reduces fundamental value in traditional models. In
Ross (1977), it leads to bankruptcy risk; in Stein (1988) and Miller and Rock (1985) it reduces
investment. There are no o¤setting real benets as separation merely changes outsiderspercep-
tions of short-run value. In Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), signaling
does have real benets, because it allows a rm to raise nancing and thus invest. Here, the
real benets arise through a quite di¤erent mechanism. Signaling has no e¤ect on the level of
funds raised: rms receive the same as in a pooling equilibrium. Instead, the benet comes in
the di¤erent type of funds. Signaling allocates scarce large investors to good managers, who
benet most from monitoring as they are most likely to have growth opportunities.
Some features of this paper have been individually examined in prior models. By bringing
together e¤ects studied in previously disparate literatures, this paper analyzes unexplored in-
teractions (e.g. the trade-o¤between termination and investment2, and the concentration e¤ect
alleviating a side-e¤ect of the disciplinary e¤ect) and thus generates new insights unattainable
from piecing together the individual results of prior research. In Boot and Thakor (1993), as
in this paper, leverage concentrates shareholdersxed dollar wealth and induces monitoring.3
In their model, monitoring has no real e¤ects. While one could combine their result with the
literature on the disciplinary e¤ect of blockholders (e.g. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997)
and conclude that the concentration e¤ect can alleviate agency issues, such logic implies that
the manager will unlever; here wishes to retain leverage. The concentration e¤ect echoes Jensen
and Meckling (1976) and Innes (1990), where debt magnies a managers equity holding, directly
inducing e¤ort. Here, there is no fundamental e¤ort conict, yet debt is still e¤ective. Leverage
incentivizes e¤ort by investors rather than the manager, indirectly improving the managers ac-
tions. The model contains two layers of agency problems: investor monitoring and managerial
investment; solving the former addresses the latter. In a model of investment alone, growth
could be induced by simply giving the manager a long-term contract and so there is no role
for debt. This paper adds a termination problem to endogenize giving the manager short-term
concerns (via the threat of ring) as optimal.
1Zwiebel (1996) also achieves dynamic consistency, through the di¤erent mechanism of an ever-present raider
(an adversary).
2Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor (2010) also show how capital structure is driven by a trade-o¤ between its
e¤ects on investment and managerial rent extraction (the analogy of ine¢ cient continuation). However, in that
paper, the goal is to deter rather than encourage risky investments.
3In Boot and Thakor and the present paper, debt is valuable as it makes equity informationally sensitive
and induces shareholders to monitor. By contrast, in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), the desirability of debt
arises because it is informationally insensitive and its owners have low incentives to monitor. Thus, uninformed
investors wish to trade debt. Mahrt-Smith (2004) studies how institutional factors jointly a¤ect capital structure
and ownership structure, rather than the how the former a¤ects the latter.
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Other papers contain a link between leverage and monitoring that does not arise through
concentration. In Townsend (1979), debt ensures that verication only occurs in bankruptcy;
his is a pure exchange economy with no real e¤ects. In Harris and Raviv (1990), debt leads
to monitoring because they exogenously assume that an audit occurs if and only if the rm is
bankrupt. In reality, investigations can occur at all times; we endogenize the monitoring deci-
sion.4 In Gümbel and White (2007), debt induces monitoring by shifting control to a tough
investor, rather than by the concentration e¤ect.5 The manager makes an e¤ort decision and
the monitor is an adversary; here she is an ally, giving the manager a reason to retain her.
Von Thadden (1995) and Edmans (2009) also analyze how ex post monitoring can induce
ex ante investment. Von Thadden assumes that monitoring is contractible; this paper shows
how debt can induce non-veriable monitoring. He also studies how debt can exert discipline;
dividends would have the same e¤ect. As in this paper, Edmans studies how ownership con-
centration can induce monitoring, but assumes that the monitors dollar investment can always
be increased if required and so capital structure is irrelevant. Here, her funds are limited and
concentration is instead achieved using debt. This method of achieving concentration has an
important advantage as it is directly under the managers control. Another di¤erence is that
this paper endogenizes the managers short-term concerns via a termination problem. Monitor-
ing in Diamond (1984) is similarly induced by increasing the monitors dollar investment rather
than by capital structure. In addition, the monitor in Diamond is a creditor and motivated
by downside protection. Here, the gains from monitoring are the upside potential from growth
opportunities, which are only enjoyed if the monitor is a shareholder.
Diamond (1991, 1993) also considers the costs and benets of short-term debt. As in this
paper, short-term debt can lead to ine¢ cient liquidation, although not distortions in invest-
ment as there is no such decision. The benet of short-term debt is that a high-quality borrower
expects that positive information will freely appear, reducing renancing costs. In this paper,
information is costly and debt has the di¤erent objective of inducing its production. In Aghion
and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), an interim termination/continuation
decision also depends on the realization of a public signal. In those models, the signal au-
tomatically appears; here it must be generated at a cost and so the nancial structure must
elicit monitoring. Cohn and Rajan (2010) also feature a concentrated outside investor whose
governance role is to generate a public signal, rather than engage in direct intervention like an
adversary. None of the above papers consider dividends as an alternative to debt.
The modeling setup draws from Stein (2005), who also analyzes the tension between liq-
uidation and long-term decisions, within the context of nancial arbitrageurs contemplating
long-run convergence trades. This paper builds on Stein by adding leverage and a monitoring
4Debt has a second informational role in Harris and Raviv: non-payment reveals that cash ows are low.
This role is also featured here and is not unique to debt non-payment of dividends has the same e¤ect.
5Specically, debt shifts control to the creditor, who is biased towards shut-down owing to his concave claim.
Since the equityholder has a convex claim, she has incentives to gather information to allow the rm to continue.
Here, debt has no control shift e¤ect compared to dividends: equityholders in a rm that has missed its dividend
are already tough and wish to liquidate the rm the essence of the investment issue.
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technology, to allow both issues to be solved simultaneously.
2. The model
A manager (M) seeks nancing of I dollars for a project. A single large investor (L) has funds
of x, and a pool of atomistic investors has one dollar each, where 1 < x < I. In reality, L
corresponds to an institutional investor such as a private equity fund or mutual fund, and the
atomistic investors represent households.6 There are four periods, summarized in Figure 1.
At t = 0, M raises x of funds from L and I   x of funds from the atomistic investors. (It
will become clear that any structure in which L invests less than x is weakly dominated, as
her monitoring incentives are weaker.) M is restricted to issue the standard securities of debt
and equity (in any combination); as we will show, this restriction is without loss of generality.
As in an IPO, all equityholders pay the same price for their shares and all creditors pay the
same price for their debt. The face value of debt raised is denoted F ; debt matures at t = 2
and its market value D is determined to ensure all creditors break even. M can also promise
a dividend at t = 2. Let P denote the total payment required at t = 2, which is the sum of
the debt repayment F and the promised dividend. We will sometimes use the term nancing
structureto refer to Ms joint decisions of capital structure and dividend policy.
At t = 1, with probability  the manager is inspired, i.e. obtains an investment idea.
Whether he is inspired is private information. An inspired manager can invest in either a Risky
(R) or Safe (S) project; the project choice is noncontractible. (We will sometimes refer to
choosing R rather than S as investing.) An uninspired manager has no project ideas and
loses money over time. At t = 2 the rm generates unobservable cash E (also referred to as
earnings.) If the rm is liquidated at t = 2 it is worth V2  E; if it is continued until t = 3
it is worth V3 (also referred to as fundamental value.) V2 is veriable at t = 2 if the rm
is liquidated, and V3 is veriable at t = 3 if the rm is still in existence. The manager is
assumed to be essential for the rms continuation, so termination of the manager is equivalent
to liquidation of the rm.
As in Stein (2005), equityholders capture the full surplus, so creditors break even and Ms
objective function consists of private benets, such as reputational concerns or utility from
incumbency, which are increasing in both rm value and his tenure. He earns b2 if the rm is
terminated and b3 in total if the rm is continued, and his outside option is zero. Appendix
B shows that the models results also hold if M instead receives a fraction of the rms assets
that increases in his tenure. The payo¤s are given below:
Table 1: Payo¤s to Investment Strategies
6x is the maximum that L can invest after taking on as much personal leverage as she is able to. The
assumption of limited funds, even in the presence of personal leverage, is standard in the literature (see, e.g.,
Boot and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001)) and necessary in models of ownership structure. If x
was unlimited, a single investor could own the entire rm, which would cure most agency problems.
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Uninspired Inspired, S Inspired, R
E V U KS V U with probability ; KS w.p. 1  
V2 K
U KS KU if E = V U ; KS if E = KS
V3 V
U V S V R
b2 b
L bL bL
b3 b
M bM bH
The parameters in Table 1 satisfy the following conditions:
V U < KU < I (1)
KU   V U > bM   bL (2)
V R > V S > KS > I (3)
bM > bL > 0 (4)
bH > bM : (5)
Equation (1) means that terminating an uninspired manager at t = 2 increases investor returns;
equation (2) means it also increases total surplus. Equation (3) demonstrates that R leads to
a higher V3 than S. The disadvantage of R is that it has a probability  of leading to the same
low earnings as an uninspired manager at t = 2. We will sometimes refer to a manager who
chooses R but delivers E = V U as unlucky or su¤ering interim losses.The investment
problemrefers to the challenge of inducing an inspired manager to e¢ ciently choose R, since
he may prefer S to avoid being viewed as uninspired. Equation (4) denotes that M prefers
not to be terminated. The termination problem refers to the challenge of e¢ ciently ring
an uninspired manager, since he will not depart voluntarily. Equation (5) means that Ms
incentives are aligned with investors if the rm is allowed to continue until t = 3: the same
project that maximizes rm value (R) also maximizes Ms private benets. This distinguishes
the paper from models of the e¤ort conict, where actions that benet investors are intrinsically
costly to managers. While E is unobservable directly, the above conditions mean that promising
P > V U reveals E to investors: only rms for which E = KS will be able to make the full
repayment. A required payment of P > V U thus has a disciplinary e¤ect.7
At t = 2, events proceed as follows. First, the level of E determines which claimholders
are in control and have the right to choose whether to continue or liquidate the rm. Credi-
tors have control if E < F , else shareholders. Second, to guide the liquidation decision, any
investor may choose to engage in monitoring at t = 2; the decision to monitor is unobservable.
Monitoring costs the investor c and has a probability  < 1 of success; as in Diamond (1984),
we assume no gains from duplicate monitoring.8 If monitoring succeeds, it generates a publicly
7Since the maximum possible E is KS , we restrict the analysis to P  KS and so for brevity do not include
the condition P  KS in the rest of the paper.
8We assume that the cost is non-pecuniary (e.g. e¤ort expenditure). The model can easily be extended
to allow c to be a nancial cost, as in Boot and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001). In addition,
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observable, unveriable signal that is fully informative of V3.9 Formally, the public signal is
N 2 V R; V S; V U ;?	, where N stands for news.The signal V i indicates that V3 = V i; ? is
the null signal that appears if no monitoring occurs, or monitoring occurs and is unsuccessful
(w.p. 1  ). Third, the party in control takes the continuation/liquidation decision based on
the signal N and the level of earnings E, if the latter has been revealed via P > V U . Formally,
she chooses action A : N  E ! fT;Cg where T (C) refers to termination (continuation). If
a signal is generated, all investors agree on the optimal decision rm value is maximized by
liquidation upon N = V U and continuation upon N 2 V R; V S	; since both debt and equity
are non-decreasing in rm value, the optimal termination decision is taken regardless of who
has control. When N = ? and so rm value is uncertain, we will show that, under the op-
timal nancing structure, the party in control will always take the rst-best decision. Thus,
the identity of the party in control does not matter. This deliberately distinguishes the model
from Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Grinstein (2006) and Gümbel and White (2007) where
the signal is not fully informative and so creditors may take the conservative action T even
when it is ine¢ cient, because they have a concave claim in the rm. Here, the driver of capital
structure is monitoring incentives rather than control rights. In sum, if a signal is generated,
it is su¢ cient to determine A and earnings do not matter; earnings only a¤ect A if there is no
signal. Thus, the action function is either A (N) or A (?; E). The timing of events is similar
to Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) except that in those papers,
the public signal automatically appears; here, it must be generated at a cost.10
The rst-best solution involves an uninspired manager always being terminated at t = 2,
and an inspired manager always choosing R at t = 1 and being continued at t = 2. To
make the nancing problem interesting, we need to impose two sets of parametric restrictions.
The rst ensures that an investment problem exists (i.e. a manager forced to make a high
interim payment will choose S) but can be cured by monitoring. It is clearer to introduce these
assumptions later during the actual analysis, as the reader can more easily see their e¤ect.
investors cannot coordinate to share the monitoring costs. This assumption is standard in any model with
multiple shareholders, else shareholder structure would be irrelevant. The results continue to hold if shareholders
can coordinate but at a cost. The model can be extended to allow for the possibility of duplicate monitoring;
it would merely involve additional conditions to show that households will choose not to monitor.
9The nonveriability of the signal rules out contracts that directly reward L for producing a signal. The
assumption that signals are observable but noncontractible is standard in the incomplete contracts literature
(e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).) It is likely di¢ cult to write into a contract
what constitutes a good or bad signal, even though this will be evident ex post, since the number of possible
such signals is likely to be very large. Once the signal is discovered, its nature (good or bad) is unambiguous 
for example, monitoring could involve undertaking an independent analysis of a drug in progress or the quality
of an existing product. Even if we allow the signal to be falsied, the monitor has no incentives to do so since,
given the signal, all parties agree on the termination decision. The model can be extended to signals that are
only privately observable to the monitor. To ensure the monitor does not shirk and simply claim to have found
a positive signal, she could write credit protection to credibly communicate a positive signal, communicate it via
trading shares (see, e.g., Edmans (2009)), or there could be a cost of communicating the signal so that she will
only do so if the signal is truly positive. The analysis assumes observable signals since our focus is information
acquisition incentives; the credible communication of acquired information has been studied elsewhere.
10Also as in these papers, we assume no bankruptcy costs in a reorganization (i.e. when creditors have control
and continue the rm); if bankruptcy costs exist, they reduce the desirability of debt. Since the negative e¤ect
of bankruptcy costs on leverage has been well explored in the literature, we exclude them here.
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These will be conditions (10), (11) and (15). The second ensures that the termination and
investment problems are su¢ ciently severe that, if unsolved, the rm is negative-NPV i.e.
the rm is only viable if we achieve su¢ ciently close to rst-best. These assumptions are:
V S + (1  )KU < I (6)
V R + (1  )V U < I: (7)
Condition (6) states that, if an inspired manager always chooses S, the rm is unprotable
even if investors obtain the maximum liquidation value of KU if M is uninspired. Condition
(7) states that, if an uninspired manager is never terminated, the rm is unprotable even if
investors obtain the maximum terminal value of V R if M is inspired. While conditions (10),
(11) and (15) are imposed throughout the paper, (6) and (7) are relaxed in Section 2.4.
The full optimization problem involvesM choosing the amount of debt and equity to issue to
both L and atomistic investors, the amount of dividends to promise and the level of monitoring
by each investor, to maximize his private benets subject to the participation constraint that
all investors at least break even, and the incentive constraint that each investors monitoring
decision is incentive compatible. To highlight the importance of monitoring, and the role of debt
in inducing non-contractible monitoring, we commence in Section 2.1 by analyzing a variant
of the model in which monitoring is impossible and derive conditions under which the rm is
unviable. We assume contractible monitoring in Section 2.2 and show that the rm is viable
when monitoring occurs. In Section 2.1, the optimization problem does not involveM choosing
each investors level of monitoring nor monitoring incentive compatibility constraints; in Section
2.2,M chooses the monitoring level but there are no incentive constraints. Section 2.3 considers
the core model with non-contractible monitoring and thus all constraints, and analyzes how to
induce monitoring via the choice of nancing structure. Section 2.4 compares total surplus
under di¤erent nancing structures. We use the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) solution
concept throughout: all players take the optimal actions given their beliefs about other players
actions, these beliefs are correct in equilibrium, and updated according to Bayesrule.
2.1. No monitoring
If there is no monitoring technology, the action A cannot depend on the signal N , but can
depend on earnings E if they are revealed through a disciplinary payment of P > V U . Since
there is no monitoring constraint in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, there is no role for debt and so we can
assume that the payment P is entirely in the form of dividends without loss of generality. We
rst consider the case where P  V U so all rms can make the payment. Since investors never
learn E, M need not worry about it and can simply choose R if inspired. We assume that
V R + (1  )V U >   KU + (1  )KS+ (1  )KU ; (8)
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and so rm value is maximized under continuation at t = 2. Since equity value equals rm
value, shareholders always take the e¢ cient termination decision that maximizes rm value (in
this case, continuation at t = 2), and so the action is renegotiation-proof.11 Since the rm is
always continued, it is worth V R ifM is inspired and V U otherwise.
Lemma 1 (No monitoring, no discipline). Assume that no monitoring occurs. In the subgame
following the announcement of a non-disciplinary payment P  V U , the unique PBE is the
following:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced, it is never liquidated at t = 2.
(iii) The rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
Proof Part (i) follows automatically from (5). For part (ii), investorsbeliefs are  (1  )
that the manager has chosen R and E = V U ,  that the manager has chosen R and E = KS,
and 1    that the manager is uninspired. From (8), the rm is continued. For part (iii), the
expected gross return to investors is
V R + (1  )V U : (9)
From (7), investors make a loss, and therefore will not nance the rm to begin with.
The problem with the above structure is that an uninspired manager is never terminated,
since he is not forced to reveal his low earnings at t = 2. A possible solution is for M to
promise a disciplinary payment of P > V U . Since an uninspired manager cannot make such
a payment, his low quality is revealed even without a monitoring technology, allowing e¢ cient
liquidation. However, the disadvantage is that the high payment requirement may deter an
inspired manager from choosing R since it risks yielding E = V U , in which case he cannot
make the payment and may be viewed as uninspired. This leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 (No monitoring, discipline). Assume that no monitoring occurs and that the fol-
lowing two conditions hold:
1  
1   + V
U +

1   + V
R < KU ; (10)
(1  )bH + bL < bM : (11)
In the subgame following the announcement of a disciplinary payment P > V U , the unique PBE
is the following:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses S if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if the payment is not met, otherwise it is
continued.
11A renegotiation-proof termination decision is one that maximizes rm value, rather than total surplus (the
sum of rm value and private benets). This is because private benets are inalienable and so the manager
cannot o¤er them in a renegotiation.
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(iii) The rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
Proof Let an inspired manager pursue a mixed strategy of R w.p.  and S w.p. (1  ). The
posterior probability that a non-paying manager is inspired is 
1 + . Investors will terminate
the rm if 1 
1 +V
U + 
1 +V
R < KU , which holds from (10). This proves part (ii). Given
this, part (i) follows from (11). For part (iii), the expected gross return to investors is
V S + (1  )KU : (12)
From (6), investors make a loss, and therefore will not nance the rm to begin with.
The intuition is as follows. The maximum posterior probability that a non-paying manager
is inspired is 
1 + . This probability is reached if an inspired manager always chooses R,
otherwise the posterior is lower. Equation (10) means that investors prefer to terminate a non-
paying manager: even if the posterior probability thatM is inspired is the highest possible, it is
still insu¢ cient to outweigh the gains from early liquidation if M is uninspired. Equation (11)
shows that an inspired manager myopically chooses S to avoid the risk of non-payment, and
so the rm is not viable from (6). For the remainder of the paper, we assume that (10)  (11)
hold, else there is no investment problem: an inspired manager nonchalantly chooses R.
Combining the results of Lemmas 1 and 2 yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Firm unviable without monitoring.) In the absence of a monitoring technology,
the rm cannot be nanced.
Proof Directly from Lemmas 1 and 2.
The rm cannot be nanced without monitoring. If a low payment is promised, an inspired
manager chooses R but an uninspired manager is never terminated. If a high payment is
promised, an uninspired manager is terminated but an inspired manager chooses S. This is the
tension between termination and investment, which is the focus of the paper.
The model has a close parallel to the case in which E is publicly observable and so there
is no need for a disciplinary payment. The high-payment case of Lemma 2 corresponds to
giving M a short-term contract which allows him to be red at t = 2. This enables investors
to terminate an uninspired manager, but deters an inspired manager from choosing R. The
low-payment case of Lemma 1 corresponds to giving M a long-term contract which guarantees
his employment until t = 3. This induces investment, but prevents termination if E = V U .
Indeed, in standard myopia models (e.g. Stein, 1988), the manager is exogenously assumed
to place weight on interim earnings but the investment issue would be solved by a long-term
contract. Here, such a solution is unworkable as there is also a termination issue.
2.2. Contractible monitoring
We now introduce a contractible monitoring technology. While we assume that monitoring
is veriable, we continue to assume that investors cannot observe whether M is inspired or
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which project he selects. This highlights the fact that eliciting monitoring is su¢ cient both
to induce optimal project selection by an inspired manager and to overcome an uninspired
managers desire to continue i.e. solving investorsmoral hazard problem is su¢ cient to solve
Ms moral hazard problem. If Ms project choice and inspiration were observable, monitoring
would be unnecessary as investors could just terminate a manager they know to be uninspired
and instruct an inspired manager to choose R. That the key unobservable action is at the
investor level distinguishes the model from Jensen and Meckling (1976), where debt is used to
directly solve agency problems at the manager level.
Since L has the greatest stake in the rm, she has the strongest incentive to monitor (which
becomes important in Section 2.3 when monitoring is non-contractible), so the analysis focuses
on her being the monitor. If monitoring is successful, the e¢ cient action is given by A
 
V U

= T
and A
 
V R

= A
 
V S

= C. If monitoring is unsuccessful, there are four possible termination
policies. The rst is A (?) = C, i.e. there is no disciplinary payment and the rm is continued
in the absence of a signal. Since the termination decision does not depend on E, an inspired
manager need not be concerned with E and so chooses R. If he is uninspired, with probability
 monitoring succeeds and investors terminate the rm for KU ; else the rm is continued and
investors recover V U . The returns to all investors and the manager are given by:
V R + (1  )  KU + (1  )V U  c (13)
bH + (1  )  bL + (1  ) bM : (14)
A second option is A
 
?; V U

= T , i.e. at t = 0 M has promised a disciplinary payment of
P > V U and so, if there is no signal to guide the liquidation decision, liquidation occurs if and
only if the payment is not met. Note that L does not need to monitor if the payment has been
made as this reveals E = KU and thus A = C is optimal. If the payment is missed (which
reveals E = V U), monitoring occurs and the rm is terminated if N 2 V U ;?	. Since the
termination decision now depends on E, an inspired manager who chooses R risks termination
if he is unlucky (w.p. ) and monitoring fails (w.p. 1  ). Nevertheless, he still chooses R if
(1   (1  )) bH +  (1  ) bL > bM , (15)
i.e. the gain in private benets from pursuing R outweighs the risk of termination. The key
di¤erence with (11), Ms incentive constraint without monitoring, is that he is only terminated
with probability  (1  ) rather than  even if he is unlucky, he is continued if monitoring
is successful. Put di¤erently, monitoring means that (w.p. ) investors make the liquidation
decision according to fundamental value rather than earnings. Therefore the manager chooses
the project which maximizes fundamental value rather than earnings, i.e. R. We assume that
(15) holds throughout the paper, otherwise monitoring becomes irrelevant as it cannot cure
myopia. In sum, assumptions (10), (11) and (15) jointly mean that M acts myopically if and
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only if there is no monitoring. The returns to all investors and the manager are given by:
(    (1  ))V R + (1   +  (1  ))KU   (1   + ) c. (16)
(    (1  )) bH + (1   +  (1  )) bL: (17)
A third possibility is A (?) = T . As with A (?) = C, E is irrelevant for the termination
decision so an inspired manager chooses R. However, from (8), it is never e¢ cient to terminate
a manager in the absence of a signal or earnings realization. A nal possibility is A
 
?; V U

= C
(i.e. monitor if and only if a disciplinary payment is not met, and continue the rm if monitoring
is unsuccessful), but from (10) it is never e¢ cient to continue a loss-making manager in the
absence of a signal. Thus, neither of these termination policies are renegotiation-proof.
In sum, both A (?) = C or A
 
?; V U

= T involve renegotiation-proof termination deci-
sions. We will call these the non-disciplinary policyand the disciplinary policyrespectively.
Comparing investor payo¤s under the two policies ((13) and (16)), the di¤erence is that if mon-
itoring fails, the disciplinary policy leads to the Type I errorof ine¢ cient termination of an
inspired but unlucky manager, and the non-disciplinary policy leads to the Type II errorof
ine¢ cient continuation of an uninspired manager. Note that (10) implies that (16) > (13), i.e.
investor returns are higher under the disciplinary policy. This is intuitive: (10) means it is op-
timal to shut down a loss-making manager in the absence of a signal, and so Type II errors are
more important than Type I errors. Thus, the disciplinary policy maximizes investor returns
as it minimizes Type II errors. However, since Ms payo¤ is higher under the non-disciplinary
policy (i.e. (14) > (17)), either may be the rst-best policy that that maximizes total surplus
(the sum of rm value and private benets).12
Since monitoring is contractible, there are no incentive constraints and only participation
constraints. Let w () be the payo¤ received by L for a given rm value; we later show how to
implement the payo¤ function w () by the choice of capital structure. The following Lemmas
summarize the two potential rst-best termination policies.
Lemma 3 (Monitoring, no discipline). Assume that L always monitors. In the subgame fol-
lowing the announcement of a non-disciplinary payment P  V U , the unique PBE is the fol-
lowing:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if N = V U , otherwise it is continued.
(iii) If the rm is nanced, the expected gross returns to L and all households are, respec-
12The e¢ cient termination decisionand the rst-best termination policyare two separate concepts. The
former is a t = 2 concept: after any payment, if promised, has been made or not made, and any signal has been
realized, is it optimal to terminate or continue the rm? The latter is a t = 0 concept that also studies whether
it is optimal to demand a payment in the rst place (and thus make the termination decision depend on it), i.e.
compares returns across the cases where a payment is promised and a payment is not promised. An additional
di¤erence is the rst-best termination policy maximizes total surplus, whereas the e¢ cient termination decision
maximizes investor returns alone since it is concerned with renegotiation proofness (see also footnote 11).
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tively:
w
 
V R

+ (1  )  w  KU+ (1  )w  V U  c; (18)

 
V R   w  V R+ (1  )    KU   w  KU+ (1  )  V U   w  V U ; (19)
If (18)  x and (19)  I   x, the rm is nanced and the managers payo¤ is
bH + (1  ) (bL +  1  )bM ; (20)
else the rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
Proof Part (i) is as in Lemma 1. For part (ii), the optimal A is automatic for N 6= ?. For
N = ?, A = C from (8). Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
Lemma 4 (Monitoring, discipline). Consider the subgame following the announcement of a
disciplinary payment P > V U and assume that L monitors if the payment is not met. The
unique PBE is the following:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced, it is liquidated at t = 2 if both the payment is not met and
N 2 V U ;?	, otherwise it is continued.
(iii) If the rm is nanced, the expected gross returns to L and all households are, respec-
tively:
(    (1  ))w  V R+ (1   +  (1  ))w  KU  (1   + ) c; (21)
(    (1  ))  V R   w  V R+ (1   +  (1  ))  KU   w  KU : (22)
If (21)  x and (22)  I   x, the rm is nanced and the managers payo¤ is
(   (1  ))bH + (1   + (1  ))bL; (23)
else the rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
Proof Part (i) is as in Lemma 2. For part (ii), the optimal A is automatic for N 6= ?. For
N = ?, A = T from (10). Part (iii) follows from simple calculations.
2.3. Non-contractible monitoring
We now move to the core case of non-contractible monitoring, which requires us to impose the
monitoring constraints. The previous two sub-sections have shown that the rm is viable only
if monitoring occurs, so we focus on how to induce voluntary monitoring by L. We consider
the two potential rst-best termination policies in turn. The non-disciplinary policy A (?) = C
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corresponds to P  V U , in which case Ls incentive constraint is:
 (1  )  w  KU  w  V U  c: (24)
Since the default decision is continuation, a signal is only valuable if it leads to termination,
i.e. delivers N = V U . This occurs if the manager is uninspired (w.p. (1  )) and monitoring
is successful (w.p. .) E¢ cient termination augments Ls payo¤ by w
 
KU
  w  V U.
The disciplinary policy A
 
?; V U

= T corresponds to P > V U , in which case L monitors
at t = 2 if and only if the payment is missed. The incentive constraint is now:


1   + 
 
w
 
V R
  w  KU  c: (25)
The posterior probability that a non-paying manager is inspired is 
1 + , in which case suc-
cessful monitoring leads to e¢ cient continuation and so Ls payo¤ rises by w
 
V R
  w  KU.
In either case, Ls payo¤ w () must be su¢ ciently sensitive for monitoring to be incentive
compatible. Regardless of which termination policy we wish to implement, w () can only take
on two values and so it is su¢ cient to consider linear schemes that satisfy limited liability. Such
a scheme has the general form w (z) = max (gz + h; 0). Since a positive h increases w
 
KU

,
w
 
V U

and w
 
V R

equally, it has no e¤ect on monitoring incentives and so we can consider
only non-positive h. The payo¤ function w (z) = max (gz + h; 0) for h  0 can be implemented
by issuing debt with face value  h=g and giving L equity. Without loss of generality, we can
thus restrict the analysis to M issuing only the standard securities of debt and equity, and L
holding equity. L thus has an equity stake of x
I D . In the presence of multiple claims (debt
and equity) it is not automatic that the party in control will take the e¢ cient termination
decision when N = ?, so we must verify that the action is e¢ cient (so that there is no scope
for renegotiation) in addition to Ls monitoring constraint being satised.
The non-disciplinary policy A (?) = C involves P  V U and thus can be implemented with
debt of F  V U ; since the payment is non-disciplinary, there is no role for dividends. The
disciplinary policy A
 
?; V U

= T can be implemented either with risky debt of F > KU or a
combination of debt and dividends that yields a total required payment P > V U . This latter
includes the case of V U < F  KU : while debt of F > V U is risky to the manager since he
cannot repay it if he delivers E = V U , it is not risky to creditors if F  KU , since they can
recover KU in a liquidation. We thus use the terms risklessand riskydebt to denote the
cases of F  KU and F > KU , and repayableand nonrepayabledebt to denote the cases
of F  V U and F > V U .
We rst consider risky debt of F > KU to implement the disciplinary policy. We then study
repayable debt of F  V U to implement the non-disciplinary policy. Finally, we analyze riskless
debt and dividends where P > V U and F  KU to implement the disciplinary policy.
16
2.3.1. Risky debt
With F > KU , creditors have control if E = V U . If N = ?, they liquidate the rm if
1  
1   + V
U +

1   + F < K
U : (26)
This holds as a direct consequence of (10); (10) also means that liquidation is e¢ cient.13
We now consider whether L will gather information. With risky debt and L owning equity,
w
 
V R

= x
I D
 
V R   F and w  KU = 0. Indeed, from the incentive constraint (25), Ls
monitoring incentives are maximized when w
 
KU

is at its lowest possible value of 0; this is
achieved by having risky debt of at least KU . Then, the incentive constraint (25) becomes


1   + 
x
I  D (V
R   F )  c: (27)
The left-hand side of (27) contains the term x
I D . We denote the positive e¤ect of F on
x
I D
and thus monitoring incentives as the concentration e¤ect. (We will shortly derive conditions
on F to ensure that (27) is satised).
With incentive-compatible monitoring and e¢ cient termination under a disciplinary pay-
ment, the equilibrium is similar to Lemma 4 and given as follows:
Lemma 5 (Risky debt, no dividends.) Assume that Ls monitoring constraint (27) holds. In
the subgame in which there is risky debt of F > KU and no dividends, the following is a PBE:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced and the payment is met, L does not monitor at t = 2. If the
payment is not met, L monitors. If N 2 V R; V S	, the rm is continued, otherwise it is
liquidated. If the payment is not met and L does not monitor, the rm is liquidated.
(iii) The expected gross returns to L and all other shareholders are, respectively:
x
I  D

(   (1  ))  V R   F  (1   + )c; (28)
I  D   x
I  D

(   (1  ))  V R   F ; (29)
If (28)  x, the rm is nanced and the managers payo¤ is
(   (1  ))bH + (1   + (1  ))bL; (30)
else the rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
13Equation (10) also means that, even if we introduce new players into the model (potential new investors at
t = 2), the manager cannot continue by raising external funds since the rm is now negative-NPV, no investor
will nance it. A outside investor also has no incentive to pay c to decide because the signal is public and so a
non-investor can never prot from monitoring. With private signals, the results of the model still go through as
debt allows new investors are able to acquire concentrated stakes if they receive a good signal, increasing their
prots and thus monitoring incentives.
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(iv) If the rm is nanced, the market value of debt is given by
D = (   (1  ))F + (1   + (1  ))KU : (31)
Proof Parts (i) and (ii) are as in Lemma 4. Parts (iii) and (iv) follow from simple calculations.
Since (28)  x (Ls participation constraint being satised) implies (29) > I D x (households
participation constraint being satised), (28)  x is su¢ cient for all shareholdersparticipation
constraints to be satised and so the rm to be nanced.
The lower bound to F is the minimum debt level that allows Ls monitoring constraint (27)
to be satised. Substituting the market value of debt (31) into (27) denes the lower bound as:
F =
c (1   + )  I   (1   + (1  ))KU  xV R
c (1   + ) (   (1  ))  x : (32)
The upper bound to F is given by substituting (31) into D = I   x, i.e.
F =
I   x  (1   + (1  ))KU
   (1  ) : (33)
Therefore, if


1   + 
 
V R   F  c; (34)
then monitoring can be induced under risky debt. If (34) is violated, the monitoring technology
is su¢ ciently ine¤ective that, even if L holds the rms entire equity, she still does not monitor.
The power of risky debt comes from two e¤ects. The disciplinary e¤ect forces the rm to pay
out cash. Since uninspired managers cannot make the payment, they are e¢ ciently terminated.
However, the disciplinary e¤ect has the potential disadvantage of deterring inspired managers
from choosing R. This is where the second role of risky debt comes in: the concentration e¤ect.
Leverage increases Ls equity stake x
I D and thus her monitoring incentives in (27). Note that
there is a countervailing e¤ect: creditors gain F   KU from the e¢ cient continuation of an
unlucky manager. Thus, if debt is riskier, they prot more and so shareholdersgains V R   F
are reduced an example of debt overhang (Myers, 1977.) Combining the two e¤ects, a rise in
F reduces the total gains to all shareholders from e¢ cient continuation, but gives L a greater
proportion of these equity gains. The overall e¤ect of increasing F on Ls incentives is given
by di¤erentiating the left-hand side of her monitoring constraint (27) to yield:


1   + x
 
V R   F (   (1  ))  (I  D)
(I  D)2 : (35)
If the rm is viable, we have (29) > I D x (householdsparticipation constraint is satised)
which implies (35) > 0, i.e. the concentration e¤ect of debt outweighs the debt overhang e¤ect.
The rm is viable under risky debt only if the net benets of debt are positive, as is intuitive.
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2.3.2. Repayable debt and no dividends
With repayable debt of D = F  V U , shareholders always have control. Since repayable debt
simply reduces their payo¤ in all cases by F , it has no e¤ect on their termination decision
and the e¢ cient action is always taken. We rst assume no dividends, so P = F  V U and
all rms can make the payment. This implements the non-disciplinary policy A (?) = C. We
have w
 
KU

= x
I F
 
KU   F and w  V U = x
I F
 
V U   F, so the monitoring constraint (24)
becomes:
 (1  ) x
I   F
 
KU   V U  c: (36)
If (36) is satised, then L monitors and the rm is liquidated if and only if N = V U . Hence,
repayable debt achieves both (occasional) liquidation and investment. The equilibrium is the
following analog of Lemma 3:
Lemma 6 (Repayable debt, no dividends.) Assume that Ls monitoring constraint (36) holds.
In the subgame in which there is repayable debt of F  V U and no dividends, the unique PBE
is the following:
(i) If the rm is nanced, the manager chooses R if inspired.
(ii) If the rm is nanced, L monitors at t = 2. If N = V U , the rm is liquidated, otherwise
it is continued. If L does not monitor, the rm is continued.
(iii) If the rm is nanced, the expected gross returns to L and all other shareholders are,
respectively:
x
I   F

V R + (1  )  KU + (1  )V U  F   c (37)
I   F   x
I   F

V R + (1  )  KU + (1  )V U  F  ; (38)
else the rm is not nanced and all payo¤s are zero.
If (37)  x, the rm is nanced and the managers payo¤ is:
bH + (1  ) (bL +  1  )bM : (39)
Proof Parts (i) and (ii) are as in Lemma 3. Part (iii) follows from simple calculations. Since
(37)  x (Ls participation constraint being satised) implies (38) > I   D   x (households
participation constraint being satised), (37)  x is su¢ cient for all shareholdersparticipation
constraints to be satised and so the rm to be nanced.
It may not be possible to satisfy Ls monitoring constraint (36) with repayable debt. Ls
monitoring incentives are maximized when F is at its highest possible repayable value of V U .
Indeed, from the general incentive constraint (24), Ls monitoring incentives are maximized
when w
 
V U

is at its lowest possible value of 0; since L holds equity, this is achieved by having
debt of V U . Thus, if
 (1  ) x
I   V U
 
KU   V U < c; (40)
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then L will not monitor under repayable debt. The equilibrium is as in the no-monitoring, low-
payment case (Lemma 1); the rm is unviable since an uninspired manager is never terminated.
(40) is likely to be satised when I is large compared to x (Ls funds fall signicantly short of
the total needed to nance the rm) and V U is small (repayable debt capacity is low).
Repayable debt has a concentration e¤ect, but no disciplinary e¤ect and thus su¤ers two
drawbacks. First, in the absence of discipline, the default decision is to continue the rm, and
so the gains from monitoring are the savings from e¢ cient liquidation, KU   V U . In contrast,
the disciplinary e¤ect of risky debt changes the default decision to liquidation. Therefore, the
incentive to monitor depends on the gains from continuation, V R F . This may be signicantly
larger than KU   V U , particularly in growth rms where V R is high. Thus, Ls incentive
constraint (36) may be violated. Second, even if the incentive constraint can be satised (i.e.
(40) does not hold), L monitors excessively. Monitoring is only worthwhile if E = V U , because
if E = KS, L automatically knows that M is inspired. Since all rms can repay the debt, L
is unable to learn E and must pay the monitoring cost in all states. Thus, Ls participation
constraint (37)  x may be violated. The disciplinary e¤ect of risky debt reveals E without
cost: if the rm meets its debt repayment, L knows that E = KS and so does not need to
monitor. This echoes Townsend (1979), where verication only occurs in bankruptcy.
2.3.3. Riskless debt and dividends
The two weaknesses of repayable debt can be addressed by increasing P above V U in one of
two ways: either increasing F to between V U and KU so that it becomes nonrepayable (but
stays riskless), or combining it with a dividend promise exceeding V U   F , so that P > V U .
Either change leads to a disciplinary e¤ect and addresses the two above drawbacks. If F  V U
(i.e. the discipline comes from dividends), shareholders have control if E = V U and always
take the e¢ cient termination decision as in Section 2.3.2. If F > V U , creditors have control if
E = KS and liquidate if (26) holds, which is e¢ cient as in Section 2.3.1. We have w
 
V R

=
x
I F
 
V R   F and w  KU = x
I F
 
KU   F. Ls incentive constraint (25) becomes:


1   + 
x
I   F
 
V R  KU  c: (41)
Lemma 7 (Riskless debt, dividends.) Assume that Ls monitoring constraint (41) is satised.
In the subgame in which there is riskless debt of F  KU and dividends so that P > KU , the
strategy prole in Lemma 5 is a PBE.
If Ls monitoring constraint (41) is satised, riskless debt and dividends have the same e¤ect
as risky debt. However, it may not be possible to satisfy (41) with riskless debt. Ls monitoring
incentives are maximized when F is at its highest possible riskless value of KU . Thus, if


1   + 
x
I  KU
 
V R  KU < c; (42)
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then insu¢ cient concentration is achieved under riskless debt. The equilibrium is as in the no-
monitoring, high-payment case (Lemma 2), and the rm is unviable since an inspired manager
chooses S. Using the results of Lemmas 5, 6 and 7 leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assume that (34), (40) and (42) hold (monitoring is induced under risky debt,
but not repayable debt nor riskless debt and dividends), and that (28) > x (Ls participation
constraint is satised under risky debt.) The rm cannot be nanced with pure equity or riskless
debt, but can be nanced by risky debt.
Proof See Lemmas 5, 6 and 7. Appendix A proves that the set of parameters that satises
these conditions is non-empty.
If the conditions in Proposition 1 are satised, both e¤ects of risky debt are necessary for
the rm to be viable. Like debt, dividends also impose discipline: indeed, in a number of
theories of debt (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Zwiebel, 1996), the only purpose of debt is
to force payout of cash and so dividends are a substitute. Similarly, in the dividend model of
Myers (2000), the manager must pay out dividends to prevent diversion and is terminated if
he misses a payment; debt would have the same e¤ect. Here, allowing liquidation is not the
only objective. Dividends are not a satisfactory substitute for risky debt because they do not
achieve su¢ cient concentration, and thus have the side-e¤ect of deterring investment.
Gümbel and White (2007) were the rst to note that debt increases shareholdersincentives
to monitor because it shifts control to creditors and thus changes the default decision to liq-
uidation. In their setting, there is no concentration e¤ect because a shareholder has unlimited
funds, and only the disciplinary e¤ect matters. Therefore, the optimal level of debt is borderline
nonrepayable: F is just above V U , i.e. just su¢ cient to shift control to creditors. Here, the
concentration e¤ect is also important, and so the optimal debt level is strictly nonrepayable.
2.4. Comparison of nancing structures
Thus far, we have assumed that both the termination and investment problems need to be
simultaneously solved for the rm to be viable (assumptions (6) and (7)), and so monitoring
is crucial. Combined with the conditions in Proposition 1, only risky debt achieves su¢ cient
concentration to induce monitoring. However, in other settings, one of the agency problems
may be relatively unimportant, and so it may be possible to nance the rm even if it is not
solved. In such a case, other nancing structures become feasible and may dominate the levered
rm. This subsection relaxes assumptions (6) and (7), so that the non-monitoring equilibria
of Lemmas 1 and 2 may become viable, and condition (40) so that monitoring may be feasible
under repayable debt, allowing the equilibrium of Lemma 3 to hold.14 The four equilibria in
Lemmas 1-4 can be implemented by the following capital structures given in Table 2:
14We do not separately consider the case of riskless debt plus a dividend because, if monitoring is incentive
compatible, it leads to the same outcome as risky debt.
21
Table 2: Implementation of Equilibria
Equilibrium Implementation
No monitoring, no discipline (Lemma 1) No dividends, no debt
No monitoring, discipline (Lemma 2) Dividend exceeding V U , no debt
Monitoring, no discipline (Lemma 3) Repayable debt F  V U , no dividends
Monitoring, discipline (Lemma 4) Risky debt F > KU , no dividends
From Lemmas 1-4, total surplus under each structure is given by15:
Unlevered, No Dividend (NODIV ) : 
 
V R + bH

+ (1  )  V U + bM (43)
Unlevered, Dividend (DIV ) : 
 
V S + bM

+ (1  )  KU + bL (44)
Repayable Debt (REPAY ABLE) : 
 
V R + bH

(45)
+(1  )    KU + bL+ (1  )  V U + bM  c
Risky Debt (RISKY ) : (    (1  ))  V R + bH (46)
+(1   +  (1  ))  KU + bL  (1   + ) c:
The relative surplus depends on a number of terms. The term (KU   V U) reects the
magnitude of the termination issue: if it is high, there are signicant savings from terminating
an uninspired manager. It will be high if the rm has tangible assets that can be eroded by
ine¢ cient continuation for example, free cash that could be wasted, or non-core assets which
would decline in value if not sold. If the rm has predominantly intangible assets, liquidation
value is low even with early termination, and so there are few gains from e¢ cient liquidation.
The term (V R   V S) reects the magnitude of the investment issue: if it is high (e.g. the
rm has signicant growth opportunities), there is signicant value creation from inducing an
inspired manager to take the risky project. The variable  reects the managers quality. If it is
low, the manager is likely uninspired and so termination becomes important. The ratio of  to
c reects the e¤ectiveness of monitoring. The term
 
bM   bL reects the private benets lost
from early termination, and
 
bH   bM measures the managers intrinsic incentives to choose
R over S.
As previously established, if both termination and investment are important (
 
KU   V U
and
 
V R   V S are high), RISKY maximizes investor returns and may indeed be the only
viable nancing structure. This is likely the case in middle-aged rms. Such rms have both
growth opportunities and tangible assets. The model can thus justify risky debt in public
middle-aged rms, and also in LBOs. Concerning the latter, Jensen (1989) highlights that
one advantage of leverage is that it forces managers to disgorge cash rather than spend it on
empire-building projects.However, if only the disciplinary e¤ect is important, then dividends
would be equally e¤ective, borderline nonrepayable debt would be optimal, and there would be
15We compare total surplus since either investor returns or private benets may be relevant for determining
which structure is observed empirically. If only one structure generates su¢ cient investor returns to allow
investors to break even, that structure will be chosen; if more than one structure achieves break-even, the
manager will choose the structure that maximizes his private benets.
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no role for shareholder monitoring so ownership concentration would be unimportant. Here, the
concentration e¤ect is also important and thus debt is not a substitute for dividends, strictly
nonrepayable debt is e¢ cient, and large shareholders actively monitor. If high leverage coincides
with dispersed ownership, there is no monitoring and so the requirement to repay debt will
induce myopia.16 Indeed, Cotter and Peck (2001) nd that concentrated private equity investors
engage in active monitoring, and LBOs perform more strongly if ownership is concentrated.
Denis (1995) compares the recapitalization of Kroger with the LBO of Safeway. In both cases,
the debt-to-value ratio jumped to over 90%, but ownership remained dispersed at the former
whereas KKR obtained a concentrated stake in the latter. Both rms generated cash due to the
disciplinary e¤ect of debt, but Kroger achieved this primarily by cutting capital expenditures
whereas Safeway sold non-core assets. Denis does not study the quality of investment (which is
typically hard to measure); if some of the projects scrapped at Kroger were positive-NPV, this
result is consistent with the models predictions that debt plus shareholder monitoring imposes
discipline without inducing myopia.
While LBOs in the 1980s were in mature rms in old economy industries and predominantly
undertaken to curb ine¢ cient investment, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) show that, from the
1990s, buyouts have predominantly been in middle-aged rms in growing industries such as
IT/media/telecoms, nancial services and healthcare. Such LBOs aim to preserve growth
opportunities in addition to scrapping bad projects. Indeed, if reducing waste is the only
goal, it may be more e¤ectively achieved by asking the manager to pay high dividends, which
would save on the transaction costs of an LBO. However, the former might deter e¢ cient
investment. Kaplan (1989) nds that investment in general declines after an LBO but value
increases, which suggests that it is ine¢ cient projects that are being cut. Lerner, Sorensen,
and Strömberg (2010) nd that innovation as measured by patenting activity does not fall and
patent quality as measured by citations rises, which implies that e¢ cient investment is not
harmed. Cornelli and Karakas (2010) nd that LBOs both improve performance and reduce
CEO turnover, suggesting that they allow the manager to take a longer-term perspective.
Investment, but not termination, is an important issue in two main types of rm. First, a
start-up has high growth opportunities
 
V R   V S, but the savings from e¢ cient termination
(KU   V U) are low because it has little cash for an uninspired manager to waste, and few
tangible assets that can be recovered even if liquidation comes early. Second, if the manager
is talented ( is high), it is unlikely that termination is optimal. From (43)   (46), NODIV
and REPAY ABLE lead to the greatest investor returns. When investment is important, it
is critical to achieve V R with the highest probability. These structures achieve this because
they never terminate an inspired manager that pursues R, even if he becomes unlucky (i.e.
they minimize Type I errors). The disadvantage is that they do not terminate an uninspired
manager with certainty, but Type II errors are unimportant if the termination issue is minor.
Indeed, start-ups are typically unlevered and pay few dividends.
16The prediction that high leverage coincides with concentrated ownership is also generated by Gümbel and
White (2007), although for reasons unrelated to myopia.
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We now compare NODIV and REPAY ABLE. Comparing investor returns under both
structures ((43) and (45)), investor returns are higher under REPAY ABLE if:
c < (1  )  KU   V U + bL   bM : (47)
For REPAY ABLE to be feasible, Ls monitoring constraint (36) must be satised. Since
F < I   x, (36) implies c < (1  )  KU   V U. Therefore, if the monitoring technology
is su¢ ciently e¤ective for repayable debt to be feasible, it always increases investor returns.
However, Ms payo¤ is lower under REPAY ABLE as he is sometimes terminated, so either
nancing structure may maximize total surplus. In contrast, if (36) is violated, there is no
monitoring under repayable debt, so it leads to the same outcome as the unlevered rm with
no dividends. Indeed, NODIV is a special case of REPAY ABLE where F = 0.
The nal case is where termination is important, but investment is less so. This is likely
the case in a mature rm with few growth opportunities and signicant free cash ow, or if
managerial quality is low. In such a rm, DIV and RISKY achieve the highest investor
payo¤s, because they terminate an uninspired manager with certainty. Comparing investor
returns under both structures ((44) and (46)), they are higher under dividends than debt if:
(1   + ) c >   V R   V S + bH   bM   (1  )  V R  KU + bH   bL : (48)
For the risky structure to be feasible, Ls monitoring constraint (27) must be satised. This
condition is consistent with (1   + ) c >   V R   V S    (1  )  V R  KU, i.e. in-
vestor returns being higher under DIV . Thus, even though Ms payo¤ is lower (from (15)),
total surplus may be higher. Previously we showed that, if REPAY ABLE is feasible (i.e. (36)
is satised), investor returns are always higher than under NODIV . Here, even if RISKY is
feasible (i.e. Ls monitoring constraint (27) is satised), investor returns can still be inferior to
DIV . The intuition is as follows. If  is su¢ ciently high, investors would like to dissuade M
from pursuing R if inspired, because it runs the risk of liquidation if monitoring is unsuccessful.
If V R is low (investment is unimportant), this disadvantage is not outweighed by the upside
of R. L can dissuade M from pursuing R by committing not to monitor if earnings are low.
However, the decision to monitor only takes place once low earnings have been realized, and so
does not depend on  (see the monitoring constraint (27)):  only a¤ects the possibility that
low earnings are realized in the rst place. Thus, even if  is high (so that, ex ante at t = 1,
L wishes an inspired manager to choose S), she may still monitor ex post at t = 2 once losses
have occurred. Since M expects to be monitored, he selects R. If the disciplinary payout at
t = 2 is via dividends rather than debt, the concentration e¤ect is avoided and L can commit
not to monitor.
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2.5. Discussion and empirical implications
The NODIV and REPAY ABLE structures considered above involve little payout, DIV in-
volves a high payout in the form of dividends, and RISKY involves a high payout in the form
of debt. Thus, while most existing research focuses on the factors a¤ecting total debt, the above
analysis suggests that total debt should be decomposed into two components: the level of total
payout P (debt plus dividends) and the composition of a given level of total payout between
debt and dividends, F
P
. We have:
Debt| {z }
F
= Total Payout| {z }
P
 Debt
Total Payout| {z }
F=P
where Total Payout = Debt + Dividends:
In turn, the two components of debt depend on the importance of the disciplinary and
concentration e¤ects, and thus the two agency problems. The severity of the termination issue
determines the importance of the disciplinary e¤ect, and thus the optimal level of total payout.
For rms in which early termination is unlikely to be optimal (e.g. start-ups), there is no need
to discipline the manager requiring a payment would merely induce myopia. Therefore, both
debt and dividends should be low, as is the case empirically.
The severity of the investment issue determines the importance of the concentration e¤ect,
and thus the optimal composition of a given level of total payout. If the termination issue
is important and an interim payout is required, it should be in the form of debt rather than
dividends if long-run growth is critical. This has both cross-sectional and time-series implica-
tions. With regards to the cross-section, rms with more growth opportunities should feature
debt rather than dividends. The positive association between growth opportunities and debt
appears to contradict existing theory (Myers, 1977) and evidence (Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
Those papers argue that debt is detrimental to growth, and so a growing rm would prefer to
be unlevered rather than levered. However, if the termination issue is important, then being
unlevered is not an option. The appropriate comparison is debt versus other forms of payout
that would achieve termination; debt is less detrimental to growth than these other solutions.
While Rajan and Zingales show that growth rms use less debt, the model predicts that this
relationship is overturned once total payout P is controlled for, or equivalently when studying
F
P
instead of F . The time-series implication is that changes in the relative severity of the two
agency problems within a rm should drive changes in capital structure and dividend policy.
For a start-up, ine¢ cient continuation is a minor issue and so total payout should be zero. As
it matures, payout is necessary to address the termination issue; the model predicts that rms
should start issuing debt before they commence paying dividends.
In addition to the determinants of debt, the model also makes predictions on its e¤ects.
Compared to the counterfactual of paying out the equivalent amount of dividends, debt increases
the level of investment, by changing it from short-term to long-term projects. This contrasts
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the standard intuition that debt reduces investment as explained above, if the termination
issue is important, debt should be compared to dividends rather than the case of no debt.
We nally discuss whether other securities can play the role of debt in the model. Preferred
equity also has a disciplinary e¤ect since preferred shareholders are promised a dividend, and a
concentration e¤ect since it does not dilute ordinary shareholders. Thus, the model can also be
applied as a theory of preferred equity. Heinkel and Zechner (1990) is the only other theory of
preferred equity of which we are aware17, which is based on the exibility a¤orded by the ability
to defer preferred dividends, rather than the concentration and disciplinary e¤ects. In contrast,
repurchases are not a substitute for debt. The manager could promise to repurchase at least
V U dollars of shares at t = 2, leading to a disciplinary e¤ect. However, repurchases do not
generate the concentration e¤ect when it is needed. The manager is able to repurchase shares if
E = KS, which concentrates Ls stake, but this is of little use since monitoring is unnecessary
in this state. In contrast, if E = V U , the manager cannot execute the full repurchase. Thus,
full concentration is not achieved, precisely when monitoring is necessary.
3. Heterogeneous managers
3.1. Analysis
This section extends the model to a setting of heterogeneous managers and multiple large
investors. There now exist two manager types. There are n good managers (type G) who have
a probability G of becoming inspired, and a continuum of bad managers (type B) who have
a probability B of becoming inspired, where B <  < G. The managers type is private
information. In addition, there are n large investors.18
We now allow bankruptcy to be costly to the manager. In the core model, a manager who
is unable to pay debt is just as likely to be red as one who misses a dividend. In reality, ring
is likelier in a bankruptcy because the defaultdecision is liquidation; if a dividend is missed,
the rm remains solvent and it requires an active decision by shareholders to close the rm.
For example, Zwiebel (1996) assumes that managers are e¢ ciently replaced in bankruptcy with
certainty, but shareholders face a cost of ring a manager in solvency due to entrenchment.
Myers (2000) assumes that shareholders face costs of collective action in liquidating a solvent
rm. We model such costs by specifying that, if creditors have control and liquidation is optimal
for them, it occurs with certainty, but if shareholders have control and liquidation is optimal for
them, it occurs only with probability  < 1. Section 2 assumed that  = 1, i.e. the disciplinary
17Other debt theories based on tax advantages or contingent control cannot be applied to preferred equity,
since it does not have these features.
18This assumption simplies the analysis as it means that each G can be nanced by one L, but it is not
critical. If the number of large investors is nL < nG, some good managers can only obtain nancing from
atomistic investors, which leads to a very similar separating equilibrium as what follows but with nG e¤ectively
being nL. If nG > nL, some managers will be held by multiple large investors, which has no e¤ect as a single
large investor will monitor them anyway (given pG >  and (27)). The analysis is thus the same as if nG = nL.
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e¤ect of dividends and debt are the same; with  < 1, the results of Section 2 would be stronger
risky debt would be even more preferred as it has a greater disciplinary e¤ect.19 20
We continue to relax (6) and (7) and instead make the following assumptions:
BV
S + (1  B)
 
KU + (1  )V U = I (49)
BV
R + (1  B)V U < I (50)
1  G
1  G + GV
U +
G
1  G + GV
R < KU : (51)
Assumption (49) states that a rm run by a bad manager breaks even, ifM pursues S if inspired
and is red with probability  if uninspired. Thus an unlevered rm which requires dividends
of V U is borderline viable. If the left-hand side was less than I, managers known to be bad
would never be funded and so a separating equilibrium cannot exist. In reality, the pricing of
physical capital will adjust so that bad managers will generate zero NPV for example, if bad
managers were unable to raise nancing, demand for physical capital would drop, causing its
price I to fall. Assumption (50) means that, if a bad manager runs an unlevered rm and is
never red, the rm is unviable. By (51), even if a good manager can signal his quality and
all good managers who become inspired choose R, investors prefer to terminate a loss-making
manager if N = ?.21 If (51) does not hold, signaling high quality would automatically solve
myopia: a good manager is not red if E = V U , and so he can choose R if he becomes inspired.
Proposition 2 gives conditions under which a separating equilibrium is feasible.
Proposition 2 Assume that the following conditions hold:
(G   G(1  ))bH + (1  G + G(1  ))bL
> Gb
M + (1  G)(bL + (1  )bM); (52)
(B   B(1  ))bH + (1  B + B(1  ))bL
< Bb
M + (1  B)(bL + (1  )bM): (53)
A separating equilibrium is sustainable in which:
(i) Good managers are nanced with D of risky debt, x of equity from L, and I  D   x of
equity from atomistic investors. If the manager becomes inspired, he chooses R. If the payment
is not met, L monitors at t = 2. If N 2 V R; V S	, the rm is continued, otherwise it is
liquidated. If L does not monitor, the rm is liquidated. The gross returns to investors and the
19Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) identify a similar reason why debt imposes greater discipline than dividends.
Under certain parameter values, equityholders will not re the manager if he fails to pay dividends as they have
a convex claim; therefore, it is necessary to shift control to the creditor. Here, as in Myers (2000), equityholders
do wish to re the manager upon non-payment, which is the essence of the myopia issue.
20All of the results in this section continue to hold with  = 1 if we instead assume thatM su¤ers an additional
reputational loss of y from his rm being bankrupt. We only require thatM wishes to avoid bankruptcy either
because ring is more common ( < 1) or more painful (y > 0).
21If creditors have control, they will terminate if 1 G1 G+GV
U+ G1 G+GF < K
U , which holds from F  V R
and (51).
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manager are given by
(G   G(1  ))V R + (1  G + G(1  ))KU   (1  G + G)c; (54)
(G   G(1  ))bH + (1  G + G(1  ))bL: (55)
(ii) Bad managers are nanced with equity from atomistic investors and promise a dividend
exceeding V U . If the manager becomes inspired, he chooses S. No monitoring occurs at t = 2.
If the dividend payment is met, the rm is continued, otherwise it is liquidated with probability
. The net returns to each atomistic investor are zero and Ms payo¤ is given by
Bb
M + (1  B)(bL + (1  )bM): (56)
(iii) Investors have the o¤-equilibrium path belief that a manager who establishes any other
structure is bad.
Since G > B, conditions (52) and (53) can simultaneously be satised. The rst (second)
condition ensures that G (B) does not deviate. L will monitor at t = 2 if

G
1  G + G
x
I  D
 
V R   F  c; (57)
which determines the lower bound on F . From G >  and (34) (which guarantees that L
monitors under risky debt in the single-rm model), (57) can always be satised.
In the analysis of Section 2, the disciplinary and concentration e¤ects allowed the rm to
be viable under risky debt. Here, the same two e¤ects allow a separating equilibrium to be
viable: the disciplinary e¤ect means that debt is a credible signal of managerial quality, and
the concentration e¤ect renders it a desirable signal which good managers are willing to emit.
First,  < 1 means that an uninspired manager is only occasionally red from an unlevered
rm but is always red from a levered rm. Debt therefore imposes stronger discipline than
dividends. As in Ross (1977), this renders it particularly costly to bad managers, as they are
more likely to be uninspired, and so taking on leverage can credibly signal managerial quality.
Second, good managers desire to signal as they benet from revealing their quality but the
gains from signaling are quite di¤erent from standard signaling theories. In traditional models,
the manager immediately benets from revealing his quality: in Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya
(1979) the signal leads to a higher stock price, to which his compensation is tied; in Myers
and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), signaling high quality is necessary to raise
funds. Here, managers are not paid according to the rms market value and do not benet
from receiving a greater level of funds, since all managers are nanced and receive I. Even
if a manager is revealed bad, he can still raise funds as the pricing of funds adjusts to reect
his low quality; such pricing does not a¤ect his payo¤ as he receives only private benets. We
deliberately assume a constant investment scale of I and that the manager only receives private
benets so that the traditional motives to signal do not apply. Despite this, good managers
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do have an incentive to signal due to the concentration e¤ect. Here, the benet of signaling
manifests solely in the type of funds. By revealing his quality, a good manager attracts scarce
large investors. One large investor provides no more funds than multiple small investors, but
is critically di¤erent as she has the incentive to monitor. Monitoring is benecial because it
allows inspired managers to pursue risky projects; this benet is particularly large for good
managers, since they are most likely to become inspired. In sum, the benets of leverage are
highest for type G and the costs are highest for type B, so separation is achieved.
The di¤erence in the incentives to signal leads to dynamic consistency of leverage. Zwiebel
(1996) notes that some theories of debt are setup models, where high debt is only possible
when the rm is initially set up. The manager dislikes the disciplinary e¤ect of debt; thus,
in Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), the manager does not adopt debt voluntarily but investors
must force it upon him in the initial period. However, such leverage is unsustainable since
it is the manager who controls the debt level going forward, and he may issue equity to buy
back debt, thus freeing him from discipline. Even in models in which the manager voluntarily
chooses high leverage to signal quality in the initial period in order to raise funds, he may wish
to reverse leverage later once funds have been raised.22
Dynamic consistency issues occur in such models because debts only role is to act as either a
signal (which is only valuable in the rst period) or disciplining device (imposed by shareholders
who only control leverage in the rst period). Zwiebel was the rst to present a dynamically
consistent model of debt; he solves this issue by introducing a raider who is present in every
period, and so it is individually rational for the manager to retain debt in every period.23
Dividends would be equally e¤ective; the theory is a dynamically consistent model of total
payout. This paper presents a dynamically consistent model of debt in particular, which arises
from its two roles. The disciplinary e¤ect credibly signals high quality, but this signal is only
relevant at t = 0, when funds are raised. If raising funds was the only goal, then immediately
after funds were raised at t = 0, the manager would undo the signal and delever.
The concentration e¤ect gives the manager an ongoing incentive to maintain leverage. Unlike
in traditional models where the benets of signaling are obtained only at t = 0 when funds are
raised, here the benets are earned at t = 2 in the form of monitoring. Delevering would reduce
Ls incentives to acquire information, thus preventingM from taking R if he becomes inspired.
Dynamic consistency can be shown by giving the manager of a levered rm the option to issue
equity to repurchase debt and promise a dividend just after t = 0, once funds have already been
raised. A repurchase of debt at t = 0 must be accompanied by a dividend promise, because
any structure that does not involve risky debt reveals the manager as bad from part (iii) of
Proposition 2.24 From (49) and (50), investors will immediately terminate a bad manager at
22If outsiders expect such deleveraging, debt will be unable to signal quality in the rst place.
23The key ingenuity in Zwiebels model is that, even though the raider is always present, his presence is not
su¢ cient to deter over-investment, because investment is sunk and cannot be overturned by the raider. Thus,
debt is needed to deter over-investment.
24This o¤-equilibrium path belief is reasonablein the sense of Cho and Kreps (1987), since bad types would
like to avoid leverage to reduce the probability of being terminated.
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t = 0 unless he promises a dividend. By promising a dividend, a manager who delevers avoids
being red since the rm remains viable (from (49)) and so the threat of ring which leads
to dynamic consistency in Zwiebel does not apply here. Instead, a good manager retains debt
even absent an external threat he does so because of the desire to pursue internal growth
opportunities. Delevering loses the concentration e¤ect of debt, preventing him from choosing
R if inspired. From (52), this disadvantage outweighs the fact that delevering reduces the ring
probability if he turns out to be uninspired.
As in Section 2, the importance of the concentration e¤ect means that strictly nonrepayable
debt is optimal. If credibility is the only requirement for signaling, only the disciplinary e¤ect
is important (since a bad manager wishes to avoid discipline) and so borderline nonrepayable
debt is optimal to minimize signaling costs. However, for signaling to be desirable for good
managers, debt must also lead to concentration. Also as in Section 2, the importance of the
concentration e¤ect means that dividends are not a substitute for debt.
A nal di¤erence with standard signaling models is that signaling can increase economy-
wide fundamental value. In a pooling equilibrium where all rms are unlevered and nanced
with dividends, a rm run by a good manager is worth
GV
S + (1  G)
 
KU + (1  )V U
compared to (54) in a separating equilibrium. If
 
V R   V S and  KU   V U are su¢ ciently
high, i.e. the termination and investment issues are su¢ ciently important, the returns generated
by a good manager are higher in a separating equilibrium. This is because the separating equi-
librium allows good managers to be monitored, which encourages them to take R and also leads
to them being terminated with certainty (rather than probability ) if they become uninspired.
The bad manager yields the same returns in both a pooling and separating equilibrium.
This result contrasts with a number of classical signaling models (e.g. Ross, 1977; Bhat-
tacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; Stein, 1989) where signaling only increases outsiders
perceptions of rm value in the short-term; actual fundamental value falls because signaling is
costly.25 In Myers and Majluf (1984) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001), signaling can increase
real value by allowing a rm to raise funds and invest. Here, signaling has no e¤ect on the
level of funds raised, since all managers raise I in both equilibria. Instead, signaling a¤ects the
type of funds: scarce large investors are allocated to good managers, who benet most from
monitoring. Note that the allocation of blockholders is di¤erent from that implied by discipli-
nary theories (e.g. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997; Maug, 1998; Kahn and Winton, 1998;
Bolton and von Thadden, 1998) which would predict that monitors should acquire stakes in
bad rms to correct agency problems. Here, the monitor is an allyof good managers rather
than an adversaryof bad managers, and so should be allocated to the former.
25Moreover, since the increased perceived value of good rms is accompanied by a reduced perceived value of
bad rms, even the short-run e¤ect is a redistribution rather than an aggregate increase.
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3.2. Applications and empirical implications
While Section 2.5 considered implications of the single-rm model, this section discusses further
implications generated by the extended model and applications of the separating equilibrium.
The extended model generates the broad implication that managers should willingly seek
and retain leverage. This has both cross-sectional and time-series implications. First, the model
is consistent with the widespread prevalence of debt in reality: if leverage were not dynamically
consistent, only rms that have just raised funds would be levered, and so the vast majority of
rms at a given time would have no debt. Second, in a given rm, leverage should be persistent
over time, as found by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008).
The core model predicts that debt is positively correlated with investment when total payout
is controlled for, since it induces monitoring. The extended model provides another reason for
this association debt wards o¤ unskilled managers who are unable to innovate. Considering a
single agent, Manso (2011) shows that tolerance of failure encourages innovation. This model
shows an important counteracting e¤ect in the presence of heterogeneous agents intolerance of
failure through disciplinary debt may screen out low-quality agents who are unable to innovate.
We now turn to real-life applications of the separating equilibrium. Good managers take on
risky debt and bad managers are unlevered; one interpretation is that the former corresponds to
an LBO rm and the latter to a public corporation with low leverage.26 Unlike in some signaling
theories, here the motive for signaling is not to obtain more funds. This is consistent with the
fact that private rms are typically smaller than public rms. In addition, while traditional
signaling models suggest that borderline nonrepayable debt is optimal, in LBOs the debt is
risky. The model also predicts that LBOs should outperform regular corporations because they
attract high-quality managers and allow them to invest optimally: investor returns are strictly
positive. Such outperformance is documented by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and Kaplan
and Schoar (2005).27
Second, the model can be applied to analyze the capital structure of investment companies,
the focus of Stein (2005). The two fund types analyzed by Stein have natural analogs in this
model. The closed-end fund is similar to the unlevered rm with no dividends, which allows
investment but not liquidation. The open-end mutual fund is analogous to the unlevered rm
with dividends: open-ending allows liquidation through permitting investor withdrawals, but
at the expense of deterring long-term arbitrage trades. The levered structure is not considered
by Stein. The analogy is hedge funds: leverage allows hedge funds to undertake risky arbitrage
trades, but also deters bad managers from establishing such funds as they will likely be ter-
minated. Indeed, Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999) nd that the average hedge
fund consistently outperforms mutual funds, even after risk and fees.
26Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2009) justify leverage in buyouts based on agency problems between
fund managers and fund investors, rather than between fund managers and operating company managers.
27While buyouts usually do not retain their high leverage permanently, leverage typically remains signicantly
above the pre-buyout level (Kaplan (1991)). In addition, delevering is achieved through selling assets, rather
than raising equity and diluting ownership. As assets are sold, the issue of ine¢ cient continuation in non-core
businesses is reduced; this reduces the optimal level of total payout and is consistent with the fall in debt.
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4. Conclusion
This paper addresses a fundamental dilemma in corporate governance: how can investors ensure
that bad managers are terminated, without inducing good managers to take myopic actions to
avoid termination? Equity nancing without dividends allows investment but prevents optimal
shut-down; promising dividends achieves termination but at the expense of myopia.
We show that debt can alleviate this tension by concentrating equityholdersstakes and thus
inducing monitoring. Monitoring is desirable even absent an e¤ort conict as it allows invest-
ment. As a result, debt is superior to other disciplinary mechanisms that achieve termination,
such as dividends, as it does not su¤er the side-e¤ect of inducing myopia. In addition, strictly
nonrepayable debt is optimal because it increases concentration.
The monitoring induced by leverage allows a separating equilibrium to be sustainable: good
managers are willing to signal quality by assuming debt. Even though signaling does not lead to
more initial funds, and the manager is not aligned to the rms market value, a good manager
has an incentive to signal to attract a di¤erent type of funds: active monitors, who allow him
to undertake long-term projects. Once the signal has been given and nancing has been raised,
the manager has continued incentives to maintain leverage and thus a concentrated monitor.
While existing empirical studies investigate the determinants of total leverage, this paper
suggests new avenues for future empirical work: breaking down leverage into total payout (which
depends on the magnitude of the termination issue), and the division of total payout between
debt and dividends (which depends on the magnitude of the investment issue). The conventional
wisdom that debt is detrimental to growth may be overturned when levered companies are
compared not to unlevered peers, but peers that pay out the same amount of cash in the
form of dividends to overcome a termination problem. This prediction is consistent with the
recent wave of LBOs, which are concentrated in middle-aged rms in industries with growth
opportunities, and so the goal is to curb wasteful projects without deterring e¢ cient investment.
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Figure 1. Timeline of the model
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A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
It is su¢ cient to show that the conditions in Proposition 1 can be satised when x = I D.
Then, by continuity, there exists an open set of parameters satisfying all of the conditions.
Setting I  D = x, the condition (28) > x becomes
[(   (1  ))(V R   F )]  (1   + )c > x: (58)
Note that
F  F = I   (1   + (1  ))K
U
   (1  ) :
Fix the values of all of the parameters except c

, and then choose a value for c

such that
(34) is satised at the upper bound of F given above. Then (40), (42) and (58) can be satised
as long as c and x is small (so  and I D are also small). Thus the set of parameters satisfying
all of the conditions is non-empty.
B. Incentive pay
This section shows that the models results are robust to replacing the managers private ben-
ets with incentive pay. So that the managers pay is una¤ected by the rms leverage, we
compensate him with a fraction of the rms assets (rather than equity alone) and assume that
his pay is senior to creditors. If pay depended on equity or was junior to creditors, pay would
be reduced by increasing leverage and so the capital structure decision would be distorted by
the desire to increase or decrease the managers pay. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Wei
and Yermack (2010) show that managers are compensated with debt as well as equity, and
Calcagno and Renneboog (2007) cite bankruptcy regulations in certain countries (e.g. US, UK
and Germany) that management can use to ensure that salaries are senior to creditors in a
bankruptcy, and give a number of examples where this occurred.
For each period after t = 1 that the manager is employed by the rm, he receives a fraction
 of the nal rm value. Thus, he receives V2 if it is liquidated at t = 2, and 2V3 if it is
continued until t = 3. It is necessary for the fraction of assets received by the manager to
increase with tenure (from  to 2) to create a termination issue, i.e. give him an incentive to
continue the rm even if he is uninspired. Otherwise, an uninspired manager would voluntarily
liquidate the rm. In reality, managers are given additional equity compensation for each
extra year they work; Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Cremers and Palia (2010) nd that a
managers equity alignment is increasing in his tenure, and Sundaram and Yermack (2007) nd
the same for a managers debt stakes. Note that we do not consider giving the manager an
optimal incentive contract. This is standard in models with a termination issue (e.g. Stulz,
1990; Diamond, 1991, 1993; Zwiebel, 1996), where the manager receives private benets that
increase with his tenure) or an investment issue (e.g. Stein, 1988), where the manager is
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exogenously aligned with short-term earnings) if it were possible to write an optimal contract
that aligned the manager perfectly with rm value, all agency problems would disappear and
there would be no need for external monitoring. Agency problems exist in reality since they
may be too large to address with a contract for example, myopic actions and entrenchment
were severe in the recent nancial crisis despite managers having substantial incentive pay (see,
e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011.) The problem of solving agency issues through contracting
rather than monitoring is a separate question studied by a di¤erent literature. In particular,
we show that it is not necessary to write an optimal contract to solve the managers agency
problem inducing investor monitoring (i.e. solving the investors agency problem) is su¢ cient.
With the manager receiving a fraction of the rms assets that increases in his tenure, the
payo¤s in Table 1 now become (using b now to denote the managers pay):
Uninspired Inspired, S Inspired, R
E V U KS V U with probability ; KS w.p. 1  
V2 (1  )KU (1  )KS (1  )KU if E = V U ; (1  )KS if E = KS
V3 (1  2)V U (1  2)V S (1  2)V R
b2 K
U KS KU if E = V U ; KS if E = KS
b3 2V
U 2V S 2V R
The analysis is very similar to the main paper. We rst start by assuming no monitoring
technology, as in Section 2.1. In the absence of a disciplinary payment, the condition for all
shareholders to wish the rm to continue at t = 2 (equation (8)) becomes:
(1  2)  V R + (1  )V U > (1  )    KU + (1  )KS+ (1  )KU
and the payo¤ to investors (equation (9)) is
(1  2)  V R + (1  )V U :
As before, investors make a loss (from (7)) and so will not nance the rm to begin with.28
Thus, Lemma 1 continues to hold.
With a disciplinary payment, the conditions for Lemma 2 (equations (10)-(11)) become:
(1  2)

1  
1   + V
U +

1   + V
R

< (1  )KU (59)
2 (1  )V R + KU < 2V S; (60)
and the payo¤ to investors (equation (12)) is
 (1  2)V S + (1  ) (1  )KU .
28Indeed, in the presence of incentive compensation, (7) can be weakened to (1  2)  V R + (1  )V U < I,
although this is not necessary.
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As before, investors make a loss (from (6)) and so will not nance the rm to begin with.29
Thus, Lemma 2 continues to hold.
With contractible monitoring and no disciplinary payment, Lemma 3 continues to hold and
the expected gross returns to L, all households and the manager are given by:
w
 
V R

+ (1  )  w  KU+ (1  )w  V U  c;

 
(1  2)V R   w  V R+ (1  )    (1  )KU   w  KU+ (1  )  (1  2)V U   w  V U ;
2V R +  (1  )  KU + 2 (1  )V U .
If a disciplinary payment is required, an inspired manager will choose R if the following analog
of (15) is satised:
2 (1   (1  ))V R +  (1  )KU > 2V S:
As in the core model, this inequality is fully consistent with (60): in the presence of a discipli-
nary payment, monitoring is necessary and su¢ cient to encourage M to choose R. Lemma 4
continues to hold and the payo¤s are given by:
(    (1  ))w  V R+ (1   +  (1  ))w  KU  (1   + ) c;
(    (1  ))  (1  2)V R   w  V R+ (1   +  (1  ))  (1  )KU   w  KU
2 (    (1  ))V R +  (1   +  (1  ))KU .
With non-contractible monitoring and risky debt (Section 2.3.1), creditors liquidate (the
equivalent of (26)) if
(1  2)

1  
1   + V
U +

1   + F

< (1  )KU
which holds from (59). The condition for L to monitor, (27), becomes:


1   + 
x
I  D
 
(1  2)V R   F  c.
Again, the x
I D term demonstrates the concentration e¤ect. Lemma 5 continues to hold and
the payo¤s are given by:
x
I  D (    (1  ))
 
(1  2)V R   F  (1   + ) c; (61)
I  D   x
I  D (    (1  ))
 
(1  2)V R   F ;
2 (    (1  ))V R +  (1   +  (1  ))KU .
As in the core model, (61) > x is consistent with (6) and (7), so the rm may be viable.
29Indeed, in the presence of incentive compensation, (6) can be weakened to  (1  2)V S +
(1  ) (1  )KU < I.
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The market value of debt (31) and its upper and lower bounds for debt, ((32) and (33)) are
D = (   (1  ))F + (1  ) (1   + (1  ))KU :
F =
c(1   + )[I   (1  )(1   + (1  ))KU ]  x(1  2)V R
c(1   + )(   (1  ))  x
F =
I   x  (1  )(1   + (1  ))KU
   (1  ) ;
and so the condition for risky debt to induce monitoring, (34), is


1   + 
 
(1  2)V R   F  c: (62)
The marginal e¤ect of increasing F on Ls incentive to monitor, (35) is


1   + x
((1  2)V R   F )(   (1  ))  (I  D)
(I  D)2 ;
which is positive if (61) > x, i.e. the rm is viable.
Turning to repayable debt (Section 2.3.2), the condition for L to monitor, (36), becomes
 (1  ) x
I   F
 
(1  )KU   (1  2)V U  c:
Lemma 6 continues to hold and the payo¤s are given by:
x
I   F
 
 (1  2)V R + (1  )    (1  )KU+ (1  ) (1  2)V U  F  c; (63)
I   F   x
I   F
 
 (1  2)V R + (1  )    (1  )KU+ (1  ) (1  2)V U  F ;
2V R +  (1  )  KU + 2 (1  )V U .
However, L will not monitor under repayable debt if the following analog of (40) holds:
 (1  ) x
I   V U
 
(1  )KU   (1  2)V U < c: (64)
With riskless debt plus a dividend, the condition for L to monitor, (41), becomes


1   + 
x
I   F
 
(1  2)V R   (1  )KU ;
and monitoring is impossible if the following analog of (42) holds:


1   + 
x
I  KU
 
(1  2)V R   (1  )KU < c: (65)
Thus, if (62), (64) and (65) hold, and (61) > x, then risky debt is the only viable nancing
structure (the analog of Proposition 1.) To prove that the set of parameters satisfying these
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conditions is non-empty, as in the proof of Proposition 1 we only need to consider the case
x = I  D. Then (61) > x becomes
(   (1  ))((1  2)V R   F )  (1   + )c > x: (66)
We rst take x = 0. The LHS of (64) and (65) are zero, so for any positive c, (64) and
(65) trivially hold. Now we just need to set c

2 (0; 
1 +
 
(1  2)V R   F) to make (62)
hold. When c is su¢ ciently small (so that  is also small but c

is xed), (66) holds. Since all
inequalities are strict and all functions are continuous, there exists x^ 2 (0; 1) such that for all
x 2 (0; x^), all conditions hold.
Finally, for the extension to heterogeneous managers, Section 3, conditions (49)-(51) become:
B (1  2)VS + (1  B)
 
 (1  )KU + (1  ) (1  2)V U = I
(1  2)  BV R + (1  B)V U < I
(1  2)

1  G
1  G + GV
U +
G
1  G + GV
R

< (1  )KU :
The su¢ cient conditions for a separating equilibrium, (52) and (53), are now:
2 (G   G (1  ))V R + (1  G + G (1  ))V U
> 2GV
S + (1  G)
 
V U + 2 (1  )V S ;
2 (B   B (1  ))V R + (1  B + B (1  ))V U
> 2BV
S + (1  B)
 
V U + 2 (1  )V S :
The returns to investors in a levered rm, a good manager, and a bad manager ((54)-(56))
are respectively given by:
(G   G (1  )) (1  2)V R + (1  G + G (1  )) (1  )KU   (1  G + G) c
2 (G   G (1  )) V R + (1  G + G (1  )) KU
2BV
S + (1  B)
 
V U + 2 (1  ) V S :
L will monitor at t = 2 if

G
1  G + G
x
I  D
 
(1  2)V R   F  c
which can always be satised from G >  and (62).
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